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Abstract 
Selectivism holds that some theoretical contents of most present theories will be preserved in 
future theories. By contrast, optimistic realism holds that most theoretical contents of most 
present theories will be preserved in future theories. I construct a pessimistic induction over 
selectivists to undermine selectivism, and an optimistic induction over optimistic realists to 
support optimistic realism. The former holds that since the selectivists of the early twentieth 
century were overly cautious about their present theories, those of the early twenty-first 
century are also overly cautious about their present theories. The latter holds that since the 
optimistic realists of the early twentieth century were right about their present theories, those 
of the early twenty-first century are also right about their present theories. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper aims to undermine selectivism and to support an alternative position that I call 
optimistic realism. According to selectivism, scientific revolutions will oust most successful 
present theories, as they did in the distant past, but some theoretical contents of most 
successful present theories will be preserved in successful future theories. According to 
optimistic realism, in contrast, scientific revolutions will oust some successful present 
theories, as they did in the recent past, and most theoretical contents of most successful 
present theories will be preserved in successful future theories.
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This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I introduce historical optimism, 
according to which most recent past theories have been stable. In Section 3, I explicate 
selectivism and subsequently construct a pessimistic induction over selectivists to undermine 
selectivism. In Section 4, I formulate optimistic realism, construct an optimistic induction 
over optimistic realists to support optimistic realism, and then display three advantages of 
optimistic realism over selectivism. In Section 5, I reply to possible objections. This paper 
primarily proposes that realists have good reasons to choose optimistic realism over 
selectivism. 
 
2. Historical Optimism 
Some philosophers paint a gloomy picture of the history of science. For example, Larry 
Laudan says that “for every highly successful theory in the past of science which we now 
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believe to be a genuinely referring theory, one could find half a dozen once successful 
theories which we now regard as substantially non-referring” (1981: 35). In a similar vein, 
Peter Lipton says that the “history of science is a graveyard of theories that were empirically 
successful for a time, but are now known to be false, and of theoretical entities – the 
crystalline sphere, phlogiston, caloric, the ether and their ilk – that we now know do not exist” 
(2005: 1265). In short, the history of science is filled with false theories that were once 
regarded as true. 
Other philosophers, however, paint a bright picture of the history of science. They are 
Ludwig Fahrbach (2011a: 148), Seungbae Park (2011: 79), and Moti Mizrahi (2013: 3220, 
2015, 2016). They distinguish between distant and recent past theories. Distant past theories 
are such theories as the ones on Laudan’s list: 
 
Laudan’s List 
- the crystalline spheres of ancient and medieval astronomy;  
- the humoral theory of medicine;  
- the effluvial theory of static electricity; 
- “catastrophist” geology, with its commitment to a universal (Noachian) deluge; 
- the phlogiston theory of chemistry; 
- the caloric theory of heat; 
- the vibratory theory of heat; 
- the vital force theories of physiology; 
- the electromagnetic aether; 
- the optical aether; 
- the theory of circular inertia; 
- theories of spontaneous generation. (Laudan, 1981: 33) 
 
These theories were accepted for certain periods of time and then rejected before the early 
twentieth century. Recent past theories, on the other hand, are those that were accepted at 
least for certain periods of time in the twentieth century, such as the oxygen theory, the 
kinetic theory, the germ theory, evolutionary theory, the special theory of relativity, and the 
Big Bang theory. They either are the successors of distant past theories or are the theories that 
were formulated in new fields of science during the twentieth century. 
Pessimists might object that the theories that are classified as recent past theories above 
are instead present theories; after all, they are accepted in the early twenty-first century. This 
objection, however, is misguided. Of course, those theories are accepted in the early twenty-
first century, but they were also accepted at least for certain periods of time in the previous 
century, and the previous century is the recent past from the perspective of the early twenty-
first century. Therefore, they are recent past theories as well as present theories. 
Three noteworthy differences exist between distant and recent past theories. First, most 
recent past theories are still accepted, whereas most distant past theories were rejected before 
the early twentieth century. Second, the number of recent past theories far exceeds the 
number of distant past theories. Fahrbach says that “at least 95% of all scientific work ever 
done has been done since 1915, and at least 80% of all scientific work ever done has been 
done since 1950s” (2011a: 148). Park states that “the body of scientific knowledge exploded 
in the twentieth century with far more human and technological resources” (2011: 79). 
Mizrahi (2013: 3219–3220, 2016) randomly selects some theories from the population of past 
theories. It turns out that most of the selected theories were recent past theories. Third, recent 
past theories were far more successful than were distant past theories, as pointed out by many 
philosophers, including Jarrett Leplin (1997: 141), Gerald Doppelt (2007: 111, 2014), Juha 
Saatsi (2009: 358), Michael Devitt (2011: 292), Fahrbach (2011b: 1290), Park (2011: 80), 
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and Mizrahi (2013). These three differences between distant and recent past theories 
constitute what Park (2017a) calls historical optimism, which holds that the history of science 
is much brighter than Laudan and Lipton suggest. 
The three historical optimists – Fahrbach, Park, and Mizrahi – claim that Laudan’s list 
is biased.
2
 As noted earlier, Laudan’s list is composed exclusively of distant past theories. 
However, a fair list of past theories would rarely include distant past theories and mostly 
include recent past theories, given that the set of the former is much smaller than that of the 
latter. Laudan did not use random sampling to ensure that each member of the population of 
past theories had an equal opportunity to be selected for his list of past theories. Since 
Laudan’s list is biased, any pessimistic induction based on it commits the fallacy of biased 
statistics. 
To go further, historical optimism rebuts the pessimistic induction over scientific 
theories constructed by Henri Poincaré and Ernst Mach in the early twentieth century. It 
asserts that since most past theories were overthrown, most present theories will also be 
overthrown:  
 
The ephemeral nature of scientific theories takes by surprise the man of the world. Their brief 
period of prosperity ended, he sees them abandoned one after the other; he sees ruins piled upon 
ruins; he predicts that the theories in fashion today will in a short time succumb in their turn, and 
he concludes that they are absolutely in vain. (Poincaré, 1905/1952: 160) 
 
Mach also says that “Whoever knows only one view or one form of a view does not believe 
that another has ever stood in its place, or that another will ever succeed it” (1911: 17). The 
conclusion of this pessimistic induction predicted that most theories which were accepted in 
the early twentieth century would be rejected. This prediction, however, was not borne out in 
the history of science. Most theories which were accepted in the early twentieth century are 
still accepted in the early twenty-first century, as historical optimism suggests. 
In this section, I showed how historical optimism rebuts the pessimistic induction over 
scientific theories that Poincaré and Mach constructed in the early twentieth century. But how 
about selectivism? Is selectivism safe from the onslaught of historical optimism? In the next 
section, I elucidate a disastrous implication of historical optimism for selectivism. 
 
3. Selectivism 
3.1. Content 
Selectivists note that some theoretical contents of distant past theories survived scientific 
revolutions while others did not. Their observations are based on several impressive case 
studies. John Worrall’s (1989) case study delves into the transitions of theories of light: 
classical particle theory, Fresnel’s wave theory, Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory, and the 
photon theory. Philip Kitcher’s (1993: Chapters 4 and 5) case studies investigate the 
transition from the phlogiston theory to the oxygen theory and the transition from the ether 
theory to Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory. Stathis Psillos’s case studies (1999: Chapter 6) 
scrutinize the transition from the caloric theory to the kinetic theory and the transition from 
the ether theory to Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory. Considering such case studies, 
selectivists conclude that the stable components of theories are trustworthy, but that the 
unstable components are not, irrespective of whether the theories are past or present ones. 
Keep in mind that this conclusion presupposes that present theories will be displaced by 
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future theories, just as past theories were displaced by present theories (Park, 2017b: 98–99, 
2017c: 65, 2018: 60–61; Stanford, 2018: 79). 
What exactly are the stable and unstable components of a theory? Different selectivists 
answer this question differently. For Poincaré (1905/1952) and Worrall (1989), the stable 
components are mathematical structures and the unstable components are non-structural 
claims of a theory. So their position is termed structural realism in the literature. For Kitcher 
(1993: Chapters 4 and 5) and Psillos (1999: Chapter 6), the stable components are working 
posits and the unstable components are idle posits. As you can see, different selectivists 
disagree about which components are stable or unstable, but they agree that stable 
components are trustworthy whereas unstable components are not, and that most present 
theories will be replaced by future theories.  
Selectivism has been influential in the scientific realism debate. Many philosophers, 
including Anjan Chakravartty (2008), Patrick Enfield (2008), David Harker (2008), Stathis 
Psillos (2009), Juha Saatsi (2009), and Peter Vickers (2017), have employed it to refute P. 
Kyle Stanford’s (2006: 19–20) pessimistic induction over scientists, which holds that since 
past scientists could not conceive of alternatives to supersede past theories, present scientists 
cannot conceive of alternatives that will supersede present theories either. Stanford contends 
that past theories were “profoundly mistaken in their most fundamental claims about nature” 
(2006: 8). His contention appears to clash with the selectivist observation that some 
theoretical contents of past theories were carried over to present theories. 
It is worth emphasizing three things about selectivism. First, it holds that past theories 
were approximately true
3
 because their stable theoretical contents are enshrined in present 
theories (Psillos, 1999: 127). It is invoked to refute the premise of the pessimistic induction 
that past theories were not even approximately true. Second, it is intended to apply to both 
past and present theories. Thus, only stable theoretical contents of present theories are 
warranted. Third, selectivists’ case studies are about scientific episodes that occurred before 
but not during the twentieth century. 
Although selectivists are regarded as critics of pessimists in the literature, we must take 
note of the important similarity between them. Both parties endorse what David Hume (1978: 
89) calls the uniformity principle: the future resembles the past. They believe that scientific 
revolutions will occur in the future as they did in the past, and therefore, present theories will 
be replaced by unconceived alternatives (Park, 2017b: 98–99, 2017c: 65, 2018: 60–61, 
Stanford, 2018: 79). The only difference between selectivists and pessimists is that 
selectivists take it to be important, while pessimists do not, that some theoretical contents of 
old theories were preserved in new theories. Thus, selectivism either collapses into pessimism 
or remains distinct from pessimism, only depending on whether preserved theoretical 
contents are rich and thick enough. I explore this issue in the next section. 
 
3.2. Thick or Thin? 
Juha Saatsi says that selectivist attempts to pin down common theoretical contents between 
past and present theories “have arguably resulted in a characterization of realist commitments 
so vague and ill-defined” (2015: 8). In the similar vein, Stanford claims that the dispute 
between pessimists and selectivists “is simply a difference of style or taste in applying the 
expression ‘approximately true’ rather than a substantive disagreement between them” (2015: 
876). In other words, selectivists have, while pessimists do not, the taste of attributing the 
realist predicate ‘approximately true’ to past theories. Stanford (2015) adheres to his previous 
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position (2006: 8) that past theories were fundamentally mistaken about the world and were 
radically distinct from present theories, and hence that preserved theoretical contents are too 
slender and meager to warrant the attribution of ‘approximately true’ to past theories. 
This paper takes seriously Saatsi’s criticism and Stanford’s criticism against selectivism. 
So it uses the name ‘selectivism’ as opposed to ‘selective realism,’ although the latter is 
widely used in the literature to refer to the position defended by philosophers, such as 
Poincaré, Worrall, Kitcher, and Psillos. In my view, only a position that is assertive enough 
with respect to unobservables deserves the appellation ‘realism.’ If a position is slender and 
thin with respect to unobservables, ‘antirealism’ is the right nomenclature.  
Why is selectivism susceptible to Stanford’s objection that there is only a 
terminological difference between pessimism and selectivism? My answer is that it is 
disputable whether the portion of the stable content of any given distant past theory is above a 
threshold or not. If the stable content had taken up most of the entire content, Stanford would 
readily agree with selectivists that the distant past theory was approximately true, and 
selectivists would undoubtedly deserve the appellation ‘realists.’ It is questionable, however, 
whether the stable content took up most of the entire content because the distant past theory 
was displaced by a recent past theory. Thus, it is ultimately because of scientific revolutions 
that the dispute arises between selectivists and Stanford regarding whether distant past 
theories were approximately true. 
 
3.3. The Pessimistic Induction over Selectivists 
Imagine that pessimists and selectivists debated the status of their present theories, such as 
the oxygen theory, evolutionary theory, the kinetic theory, the germ theory, the Big Bang 
theory, the special theory of relativity, and the theory of plate tectonics in the early twentieth 
century. According to the pessimists, scientific revolutions would occur in the future as they 
did in the past, and as a result, most of their present theories would end up in the graveyard of 
theories, just as most of their past theories did, including the Ptolemaic theory, the caloric 
theory, the miasma theory, and the ether theory. The selectivists agreed with the pessimists, 
but added that some theoretical contents of most of their present theories would be retained, 
similarly to some theoretical contents of most of their past theories. 
In retrospect, we can see from the vantage point of the early twenty-first century that 
both the pessimists and the selectivists were wrong about their present theories. It is a 
historical fact that most of their present theories have not yet been abandoned, as pointed out 
by Fahrbach (2011a: 148), Park (2011: 79), and Mizrahi (2013: 3220, 2015, 2016). Thus, the 
selectivists conceded too much to the pessimists, i.e., they were overly cautious about their 
present theories. They believed that only some theoretical contents of most of their present 
theories were true, though they could have believed that most theoretical contents of most of 
their present theories were true. Even if they had believed the latter, they would have been 
right, given that most of their present theories had not yet been overturned. In sum, the 
selectivists of the early twentieth century would have believed less when they could have 
believed more. 
     What is wrong with selectivists being overly cautious about a theory? As suggested 
earlier, pessimists might covet selectivism. If only some theoretical contents of a theory are 
true, then it is controversial whether the theory is approximately true. In contrast, if most of 
its theoretical contents are true, it is not controversial whether it is approximately true. Thus, 
if you want to believe that a theory is approximately true, you should believe that most of its 
theoretical contents are true. However, selectivists believe that only some theoretical contents 
of present theories are true in accordance with their tenet that present theories will be 
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surpassed by future theories. Hence, they have the burden of fighting pessimists who 
maintain that selectivism is theirs.  
From the mistake of the selectivists of the early twentieth century, we can construct a 
pessimistic induction against selectivists. It maintains that since the selectivists of the early 
twentieth century were inordinately cautious about their present theories, those of the early 
twenty-first century, such as Worrall, Kitcher, and Psillos, are also inordinately cautious 
about their present theories. To go further, future selectivists will similarly be inordinately 
cautious about their present theories. This reasoning might be called the pessimistic induction 
over selectivists. 
The pessimistic induction over selectivists is in accordance with the uniformity 
principle that selectivists endorse. As noted earlier, they believe, as pessimists do, that the 
future resembles the past, so present theories will be supplanted by future theories, just as 
past theories were supplanted by present theories. Optimists differ from selectivists only with 
respect to which part of the history of science should be invoked to make a prediction about 
the future development of science. Optimists utilize, while selectivists do not, the historical 
fact that most recent past theories have been stable. 
An influential form of selectivism today is structuralism. James Ladyman states that 
“[s]tructural realism is considered by many realists and antirealists alike as the most 
defensible form of scientific realism” (2014). In my view, the realists and the antirealists 
might be right that structuralism is a defensible position. It is not clear, however, whether it is 
a defensible form of realism or antirealism, although the name ‘structural realism’ suggests 
that it is a form of realism. It is devised under the assumption that present theories will be 
displaced by alternatives, just as past theories were displaced by alternatives. That 
assumption, however, is problematic, and structuralists are vulnerable to the pessimistic 
induction over selectivists sketched in this section. So ‘structuralism’ is a better term than 
‘structural realism.’ 
 
4. Optimistic Realism 
4.1. Content 
The mistake of selectivists sketched in the previous section motivates a new realist position 
that I term optimistic realism. According to this position, most present theories will be stable, 
they will at best go through minor revisions in the future development of science, and they 
will be (approximately) true in light of future theories. 
Optimistic realism and selectivism are substantially distinct positions. They hold, 
respectively, that scientific revolutions will drive out some and most present theories. In 
addition, they hold, respectively, that most and some theoretical content of a stable present 
theory will be preserved in a future theory. In sum, optimistic realism is more assertive than 
selectivism with respect to the portion of the population of present theories that will remain 
stable, and with respect to the portion of the theoretical content of a present theory that will 
remain stable. 
How does optimistic realism differ from historical optimism introduced in Section 2? 
While historical optimism is a view about distant and recent past theories, optimistic realism 
is a view about present theories. Relatedly, while historical optimism is designed to refute the 
premise of the pessimistic induction that most past theories were thrown out, optimistic 
realism is designed to specify the epistemic attitude that we should take towards present 
theories. Despite this difference, however, they can go hand in hand, leading to an optimistic 
induction, which I unpack in the next section. 
 
4.2. The Optimistic Induction over Optimistic Realists 
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Imagine that optimistic realists and pessimists debated over the status of their present theories 
in the early twentieth century. According to the optimistic realists, most of their present 
theories would be retained and would at best go through minor revisions, in which case they 
would be (approximately) true in light of future theories. According to the pessimists, by 
contrast, most of their present theories would be discarded, in which case they would not 
even be approximately true in light of future theories. We can see from the perspective of the 
early twenty-first century that the optimistic realists were right about their present theories. 
This historical observation motivates an optimistic induction that since the optimistic realists 
of the early twentieth century were right about their present theories, those of the early 
twenty-first century are also right about their present theories. To go further, future optimistic 
realists will similarly be right about their present theories. This reasoning might be called the 
optimistic induction over optimistic realists. 
The optimistic induction over optimistic realists is in accordance with the uniformity 
principle that pessimists and selectivists endorse. Optimistic realists claim that the future 
resembles the recent past in terms of the frequency of scientific revolutions. The only point of 
difference between the opposing parties concerns which part of the past should be invoked to 
theorize about future science, viz., while optimistic realists make use of the recent past, 
pessimists and selectivists make use of the distant past. 
In this section, I constructed the optimistic induction over optimistic realists to support 
optimistic realism. In Section 3.3, I constructed the pessimistic induction over selectivists to 
undermine selectivism. The optimistic induction and the pessimistic induction rely on the 
same historical fact that most recent past theories have been stable. The two inductions, 
however, are distinct from each other, given that the former is over optimistic realists 
whereas the latter is over selectivists. 
 
4.3. Advantages 
In this section, I present three advantages of optimistic realism over selectivism. First, 
optimistic realism is immune to Stanford’s (2009: 385) criticism against selectivism that no 
criterion is provided for distinguishing between stable and unstable theoretical contents. In 
the absence of such criteria, we cannot discern stable theoretical contents of present theories, 
although we can discern stable theoretical contents of past theories in retrospect. The stable 
theoretical contents of past theories are those that are also found in present theories. Since 
present theories are not yet replaced by future theories, we cannot tell which theoretical 
contents of present theories will be retained in future theories. This criticism against 
selectivism is inapplicable to optimistic realism, given that optimistic realism is not saddled 
with the distinction between stable and unstable theoretical contents. Optimistic realists 
simply believe that most contents of most present theory are true, i.e., most present theories 
are (approximately) true, without distinguishing between stable and unstable constituents. 
Thus, they do not have the burden of specifying which theoretical contents are trustworthy 
and which are not. 
Second, optimistic realism is also immune to Stanford’s criticism against selectivism 
that only a terminological difference exists between pessimism and selectivism. Stanford’s 
objection to selectivism is predicated on the observation that most past theories were 
profoundly mistaken about the world in light of present theories. For example, the phlogiston 
theory is radically false in light of the oxygen theory. Such an objection to selectivism, 
however, does not apply to optimistic realism. As we noted in Section 2, most recent past 
theories coincide with present theories. So it is wrong to say that recent past theories were 
profoundly mistaken about the world in light of present theories. For example, it is wrong to 
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say that the oxygen theory is radically false in light of the oxygen theory. Thus, the difference 
between pessimism and optimistic realism is not merely terminological but substantial. 
Third, as noted in Section 2, many philosophers highlight that recent past theories were 
far more successful than distant past theories. This observation of the difference between 
distant and recent past theories requires us to treat them differently, i.e., we should assume 
different epistemic attitudes towards them. Selectivists, however, assume the same epistemic 
attitude towards them: they believe that only some theoretical components of both distant and 
recent past theories were trustworthy. In contrast, optimistic realists assume different 
epistemic attitudes towards them: while they believe that some theoretical contents of most 
distant past theories were true, they believe that most theoretical contents of most recent past 
theories were true. Thus, optimistic realism reflects, while selectivism does not, the empirical 
superiority of recent past theories over distant past theories. 
 
5. Objections and Replies 
Pessimists might object that we have two reasons for rejecting historical optimism. First, 
some recent past theories underwent major revisions. For example, the standard model of 
particle physics was crowned as a universal theory of material systems in the mid-1970s 
when it was confirmed that the hadrons were composed of fractionally charged quarks. In the 
1990s, however, cosmological observations provided convincing evidence that dark matter 
and energy take up 95% of the materials in the universe, and that they are anomalies to the 
standard model. Second, quantum mechanics and the general theory of relativity are 
incompatible with each other, so it is likely that they will be replaced by future theories. 
Optimistic realism overlooks something most philosophers of science and scientists find 
especially exciting about science today, viz., the vibrant metaphysical turmoil at its most 
fundamental levels. 
This paper assumes for the sake of argument that the standard model of particle physics 
was overturned, and that the existence of dark matter and energy is established, although they 
are invoked to explain the expansion of the universe and the motion of stars in a galaxy, and 
scientists have not yet obtained independent evidence for their existence. This paper also 
assumes for the sake of argument that quantum mechanics and the general theory of relativity 
will be replaced by a radically different theory or theories, although it is debatable whether 
they will be (Park, 2015: 223). This paper instead points out that the objection that some 
recent past theories were or will be replaced by radically different alternatives is compatible 
with historical optimism that most recent past theories have not yet been and will not be 
overthrown, and that they have retained and will retain most of their theoretical contents. In 
order to refute historical optimism, pessimists need to show not that some recent past theories 
were and will be discarded but that most recent past theories were and will be overthrown. 
     It is unlikely that pessimists will be able to show that most recent past theories were 
overthrown. To reiterate, Mizrahi (2013: 3219–3220, 2016) randomly chooses some theories 
from the population of past theories and demonstrates that most past theories are not yet 
abandoned. Pessimists should also choose some theories from the population of past theories 
and demonstrate that most past theories were abandoned. Optimistic realism remains 
unscathed, even if some fundamental physical theories were or will be overturned. The 
vibrant metaphysical turmoil is powerless in front of Mizrahi’s random sampling, just as 
Superman is in front of Kryptonite. 
Let me now turn to selectivists’ possible response to my denial that selectivism is a 
form of realism.4 They might admit that they are overly cautious about present theories, but 
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insist that selectivism is a form of realism. As Popper argued already in the 1960s, a scientific 
theory may go through a scientific revolution, and yet it can be approximately true theory. 
For example, Newtonian mechanics is still approximately true, even if it was replaced by the 
theory of relativity. It follows that we are entitled to believe that present theories are 
approximately, although they will be displaced by future theories. 
I take Stanford’s criticism against selectivism seriously that past and present theories 
radically differ from each other, so present and future theories will also be radically differ 
from each other, and it is controversial whether to attribute ‘approximate truth’ to present 
theories or not. The fact that Popper attributes it, while pessimists do not, to past theories 
shows that Popper and pessimists have different tastes on whether to attribute it to past 
theories or not, and hence to present theories or not. Selectivists are vulnerable to such an 
objection, in my view, because they believe that present theories will go through scientific 
revolutions, as past theories did, and that as a result, they will lose their significant parts. 
Realists would not be subject to the objection, if they believed that scientific revolutions 
would not occur, so present theories would not lose their significant parts. In the absence of 
scientific revolutions, rational agents would have no choice but to attribute the realist 
predicate to present-cum-future theories. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Selectivists concede too much to pessimists. Their excessive concession leads to Stanford’s 
criticism that only a terminological difference exists between pessimism and selectivism as 
well as to the pessimistic induction over selectivists, which states that since the selectivists of 
the early twentieth century were unduly cautious about their present theories, those of the 
early twenty-first century are also unduly cautious about their present theories. Optimistic 
realism is proposed as a realist alternative to selectivism. It is supported by the optimistic 
induction over optimistic realists, which holds that since the optimistic realists of the early 
twentieth century were right about their present theories, those of the early twenty-first 
century are also right about their present theories. The history of science teaches us that 
realists should choose optimistic realism over selectivism. This paper can be summarized in a 
simple sentence: selectivism recommends less when we deserve more. 
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